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Several scholars have suggested that states should play a much 
more limited role in antitrust enforcement, especially in matters that 
are national or global in scope. In this paper, we analyze the states’ 
part in the Microsoft case—a case that illustrates the costs of state 
intervention in antitrust matters that extend beyond state borders. 
Here, the states’ involvement lengthened the lawsuit, complicated the 
settlement process, and increased both legal uncertainty and litigation 
costs. These results followed from the states’ focus on parochial 
interests rather than broader concerns for efficiency and equity. We 
conclude that a state’s antitrust enforcement authority should be 
restricted in matters that extend beyond its borders. 
After analyzing the motivations for state behavior in federal 
antitrust, we consider whether restrictions should apply to federal 
antitrust authorities in cases with international implications. Though a 
global competition authority could, in principle, be designed to 
maximize economic well-being, practical and political obstacles 
appear to rule this option out, at least in the short term. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust regulation is an important government tool for curbing 
excesses in a market economy.
1
 These excesses can result from a 
variety of behaviors, such as illegal acts to maintain a monopoly or 
collusion with the goal of raising prices.
2
 In reducing the incentive for 
firms to engage in certain types of anticompetitive behavior, antitrust 
regulation is intended to promote consumer welfare.
3
 Remedies used 
 
1. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION ch. 19 (3d
 ed. 2000); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW pt.1 (2d
 ed. 
2001). 
2. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 1, at 616-17. 
3. Within the U.S., most analysis proceeds from the assumption that consumer welfare 
is the appropriate yardstick by which to measure competitive effects. See R OBERT H. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 (1993) (“The only 
legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare.”); 
Robert E. Litan & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy During the Clinton Administration, in 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990S 435 (Jeffery Frankel & Peter Orzag eds., 
2002) (“For at least 20 years a broad, bipartisan consensus has prevailed regarding the goal 
of U.S. antitrust policy: to foster competitive markets and to control monopoly power, not 
to protect smaller firms from tough competition by larger corporations. The interests of 
consumers in lower prices and improved products are paramount.”). Other scholars would 
broaden consumer welfare to “social welfare,” which includes producer surplus as well as 
consumer surplus. “Consumer surplus” is an economic term of art indicating the difference 
between what value a consumer holds for a good or service and what that consumer must 
actually pay to obtain the good or service. A similar definition holds for producer surplus: 
it is the difference between what a producer would sell a good or service for and what it is HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
No. 3]  Federalism in Antitrust 879 
in antitrust regulation range from breaking up a company to imposing 
financial penalties on a firm for inappropriate conduct.
4
 
The United States was one of the first countries to enact antitrust 
laws and has traditionally been one of the most active enforcers of 
them.
5
 The U.S. government is the primary enforcer.
6
 But the 
individual states have enacted their own antitrust laws and, at various 
times, have been quite active in their enforcement.
7
 
In recent years, more states within the United States, as well as 
many countries, have taken an active role in antitrust policy.
8
 With a 
larger number of players in the antitrust regulation arena, there are 
likely to be increased conflicts as different nations and states pursue 
different policies. The problem is exacerbated as commerce becomes 
increasingly global. This paper focuses on the appropriate role of the 
states and the federal government in antitrust regulation, but also 





Several scholars, including U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
                                                                                                                              
actually able to sell that good or service for. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS, 135, 140 (1998). See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 1, at 604 (“Most 
economists believe the antitrust laws should  have the very simple goal of promoting 
efficiency. That is, they should prevent practices or amalgamations of firms that would 
harm society through the exercise of market power.”); POSNER, supra note 1, at 23 (“[T]he 
courts and the scholars alike are now pretty uniformly committed to the economic 
approach.”). 
4. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 653 (2d ed. 2002). 
5. Canada became the first country to enact competition laws when it enacted “the Act 
for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations in Restraint of Trade” in 1889, one 
year before the United States enacted the Sherman Act. MARK  R. JOELSON, AN 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, 
EUROPEAN UNION, AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3 
(2d ed. 2001). 
6. In addition to federal and state antitrust agencies, private parties play a role in U.S. 
enforcement as well. See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000). 
7. See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed 
Federal/State Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047 (1990). 
8. Aside from the United States, the European Commission is probably the most active 
enforcer of antitrust laws, but as many as 90 countries have enacted competition laws. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INT’L  COMPETITION  POLICY  ADVISORY  COMMITTEE TO THE 
ATT’Y  GEN.  AND ASSISTANT ATTY GEN.  FOR ANTITRUST: FINAL REPORT ch. 2 (Feb. 
2000). 
9. We focus here on whether a state should have a role in antitrust cases that extends 
beyond its borders or beyond what the federal government chooses to pursue. 
10. Other justifications for antitrust laws, such as protecting national interests or certain 
groups such as small businesses, have been suggested in the past. As noted above, in the 
U.S. and the European Union (EU), at least, there is a consensus that the primary objective 
of antitrust laws should be promoting consumer welfare. See supra note 3; CARLTON & 
PERLOFF, supra note 1, at 617. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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Richard Posner, have suggested that the states should not be in the 
business of antitrust regulation.
11
 Posner suggests that states do not 
have adequate resources to perform the task and are excessively 
influenced by a defendant’s competitors.
12
 Specifically, he argues that 
state involvement does nothing but “lengthen the original lawsuit, 
complicate settlement, magnify and protract the uncertainty 
engendered by the litigation, and increase litigation costs.”
13
 
To mitigate the problems of rent seeking and free riding,
14
 several 
commentators have proposed limits on the states’ role in antitrust 
enforcement. Posner argues that states should not be allowed to file 
antitrust charges except in situations in which a private firm would be 
able to file a suit.
15
 Robert Bell argues that a state should only play a 
role in antitrust matters confined to its own borders.
16
 And Robert 
Lande proposes that states agree to refrain from challenging 
“specified exceptionally large, truly national transactions, and 
transactions that primarily do not affect that state.”
17
 While these 
authors disagree on the extent of state involvement in antitrust 
 
11. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940-41 
(2001); Robert B. Bell, States Should Stay Out of National Mergers, 3 ANTITRUST 37, 39 
(Spring 1989). See also the discussion in Lande, supra note 7. 
12. Posner, supra note 11, at 940-41. In addition to being more prone to local influence, 
the states have little to contribute to prosecution of the case. As Lande states, “[a] state 
assistant attorney general, who might in his or her career have seriously examined the 
competitive effects of only a handful of mergers, is more likely to make mistakes during 
his or her occasional forays into merger enforcement no matter how intelligent, diligent, 
and public-spirited the effort.” See Lande, supra note 7, at 1064. 
13. Posner, supra note 11, at 940. 
14. Rent seeking is the redistribution of existing resources through non-market activity, 
such as lobbying. Anne Krueger coined the term “rent seeking” in The Political Economy 
of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974). See also D ENNIS  C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC  CHOICE  II 229-46 (1989); MANCUR  OLSON  JR., THE  LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 141-48 (1971). Free 
riding occurs when one entity is able to benefit from the efforts of another without paying. 
For example, if Smith plants a flowerbed, and Jones enjoys the view without paying, Jones 
is said to be free riding. Free riding typically arises in the context of public goods whose 
consumption is not easily excluded. For a classic treatment, see Paul Samuelson, The Pure 
Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). 
15. Posner proposes to strip states of their power to bring parens patriae suits on behalf 
of consumers. They would still be allowed to sue, as a private company would, in 
instances in which state agencies directly suffered antitrust injury. Posner, supra note 11, 
at 940. 
16. See Bell, supra note 11, at 39. 
17. Lande, supra note 7, at 1072-73. Lande argues that this kind of compromise would 
require a voluntary agreement on the part of the states. Id. As Herbert Hovenkamp notes, 
states do have a right to apply state antitrust laws to situations involving interstate 
commerce “[s]ince the Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that preemption is 
not to be presumed or inferred, and because Congress clearly intended that state antitrust 
law not be preempted as a general matter. . . .” Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the 
Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L. J. 375, 389-90 (1983). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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matters, they are in accord that the states have little to add to cases 
with a national scope.
18
 Moreover, the states have the potential to 
cause great harm. We argue in this paper that the states did just that in 
the Microsoft trial. 
The issue of state involvement in national antitrust enforcement 
reemerged in United States v. Microsoft Corporation.
19
 Nine states 
and the District of Columbia rejected a settlement proposed by the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), nine other states and Microsoft.
20
 
Led by California, the District of Columbia along with Connecticut, 
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Utah, and West 
Virginia chose to pursue litigation against Microsoft.
21
 
In response, Microsoft filed a motion to dismiss the non-settling 
states’ demand for additional conduct remedies, arguing that the states 
did not have legal standing to seek a remedy separate from that 
accepted by the federal government.
22
 The plaintiffs, joined by 
twenty-five other states (including many of those states that accepted 
the settlement), argued that existing case law did provide standing for 
separate state action.
23
 The DOJ agreed with the states, but noted that 
Microsoft had raised valid policy issues. Although D.C. District Court 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly
24
 denied Microsoft’s motion, she seemed to 
agree with the DOJ that the problems Microsoft discussed in its brief 
were worth addressing at a later date. 
 
18. Indeed, because of their limited experience with any antitrust matters, state 
attorneys general are more likely to make mistakes at the state level as well. See the 
discussion of state resources and expertise in Lande, supra note 7, at 1064. See also Bell, 
supra note 11, at 37, 39. 
19. See Plaintiff Litigating States’ First Amended Proposed Remedy, New York v. 
Microsoft, (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 98-1233). A procedural history of the Microsoft Antitrust 
Litigation can be found in United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150-51 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
20. The nine settling states are New York, Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d at n.1. 
21. Plaintiff Litigating States’ at 1, New York (No. 98-1233). 
22. Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s Motion for Dismissal of the Non-Settling 
States’ Demands for Equitable Relief, New York v. Microsoft, (D.D.C 2002) (No. 98-
1233). 
23. See Plaintiff Litigating States’ Response to Microsoft’s Motion for Dismissal of the 
Non-Settling States’ Demand for Equitable Relief, New York v. Microsoft, (D.D.C. 2002) 
(98-1233). 
24. Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly is the federal district court judge assigned to the case 
on remand after the Court of Appeals decision. She replaced federal district court Judge 
Thomas Penfield Jackson, who was disqualified retroactively to the date he ordered the 
breakup of Microsoft. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 116-117 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (“We therefore will vacate that order in its entirety and remand this case to a 
different District Judge, but will not set aside the existing Findings of Fact or Conclusions 
of Law (except insofar as specific findings are clearly erroneous or legal conclusions are 
incorrect).”). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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In this paper, we analyze the litigating states’ proposed antitrust 
remedy, highlighting why the states should be preempted by federal 
antitrust actions when a case is national in scope.
25
 This case provides 
an excellent example of the problems that arise when states file 
follow-on suits in federal antitrust proceedings. After reaching an 
agreement with the DOJ and several states, Microsoft still faced a 
series of accusers, each with the potential to sabotage the settlement. 
Further, as we show, the non-settling states’ proposed remedy 
exemplifies the kind of rent seeking likely to take place when state 
attorneys general (AGs) enter the antitrust arena in federal cases.
26
 
The Microsoft case thus offers an ideal opportunity to analyze the 
issues of federalism in antitrust regulation. 
One problem with state enforcement is that state officials do not 
face appropriate incentives to represent U.S. consumer interests in an 
antitrust case that could have national, or even international, 
ramifications.
27
 State AGs typically face pressure from well-organized 
coalitions of in-state businesses and consumer groups arguing for the 
prosecution of an out-of-state company. Indeed, one would expect 
that these interest groups would attempt to impose costs on firms or 
individuals situated outside of their own state’s borders.
28
 And that is 
exactly what happened in the Microsoft case. 
A second issue relates to lack of expertise and resources. While 
state involvement can add to the length of a trial, make a settlement 
more difficult, and generally increase the costs and uncertainty of a 
trial, this involvement is not likely to benefit consumers. In the 
 
25. We focus on the economic reasons for limiting state authority in national antitrust 
cases and do not analyze the case law on this matter. “National” refers to any case that 
impacts consumers beyond a state’s immediate borders or nearby region. Some scholars, 
Posner included, would have states excluded from almost all antitrust enforcement. See 
Posner, supra note 11, at 940-41. As we discuss later in the paper, we do not go this far, 
arguing instead that a state should be preempted by federal action and limited in cases that 
extend beyond its borders. 
26. The problem of rent seeking does not arise only in the United States. Political issues 
emerge in antitrust cases across national boundaries as well. For example, the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger cleared U.S. review rather quickly, but received intense 
political scrutiny in Europe, where Airbus is headquartered. In the end, the European 
Commission cleared the merger, but required the firms to change several business 
practices. See Eleanor M. Fox, Lessons from Boeing: A Modest Proposal to Keep Politics 
Out of Antitrust, ANTITRUST REP., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 19. 
27. Section IV addresses some of the problems with national or trans-national antitrust 
agencies addressing markets that are truly international or global in scope. For a general 
analysis,  See  ANTITRUST  GOES  GLOBAL: WHAT  FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC 
COOPERATION? (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000). See also David S. Evans, The New 
Trustbusters, Brussels and Washington May Part Ways, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 14 (2002). 
28. For an empirical analysis of geography-influenced antitrust enforcement, see Roger 
L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J. L. & ECON. 329 (1982). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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Microsoft case, the states derailed early settlement talks
29
 and clouded 
the settlement finally reached by the DOJ. Moreover, the states 
offered little in the way of new arguments or data related to 
anticompetitive practices. In fact, the states only became major 
players in the remedies phase of the trial. 
The proposed remedy put forth by the litigating states illustrates 
“the tendency of antitrust litigation to create multiple lawsuits out of a 
single dispute.”
30
 The states did not have the resources to contribute 
meaningfully to the prosecution during the Microsoft trial. Instead, 
these states had parochial interests in mind rather than some general 
concern with national economic well-being. 
Parallel arguments apply to the role of national interests in antitrust 
cases that involve international markets or consumers outside the 
United States. While the issues of available resources and antitrust 
expertise are not relevant for the United States’ antitrust agencies, 
they certainly can be of concern for smaller countries. Moreover, the 
existence of multiple antitrust laws across countries and differences in 




Finally, national interests—rather than a concern for global 
consumer welfare—can interfere with the efficient application of 
antitrust enforcement.
32
 Several economists have suggested that the 
world needs a unified antitrust approach—say, under the authority of 
the World Trade Organization.
33
 We discuss some of the practical 
issues associated with a global antitrust authority.
34
 We conclude that, 
while in principle such an authority might effectively address many of 
the issues discussed in this paper, practical and political obstacles rule 
this option out, at least in the short term. 
Section II of this paper examines the problems with state 
involvement in antitrust cases brought by a federal agency. Both 
theory and evidence suggest that rent seeking is a salient feature in 
many proceedings. We also show that the states lack the resources to 
handle national antitrust cases. Moreover, even if rent seeking and 
 
29. KEN AULETTA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFT AND ITS ENEMIES 347 (2001). 
30. Posner, supra note 11, at 940. 
31. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 27, at 15. 
32. This assumes that consumer welfare is the main goal of antitrust. As we discuss in 
Section IV, this goal is not shared by all countries with competition policies in place. 
33. See, e.g., F. MICHAEL  SCHERER, COMPETITION  POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED 
WORLD ECONOMY 91-96 (1994). 
34. In our discussion in Section IV, other options are considered as well, such as the 
harmonization of antitrust policies across countries and regions. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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resources were not issues, state involvement in national antitrust 




Section III provides a case study of federalism in antitrust 
enforcement. We analyze United States. v. Microsoft, examining 
lobbying behavior and key provisions in the litigating states’ 
proposed remedy.
36
 This suit clearly illustrates the arguments against 
state involvement in national antitrust cases. The states had little to 
offer during the trial but were major players during the remedies 
phase. The potential beneficiaries of the litigating states’ remedy 
proposal are Microsoft’s rivals, not software consumers. 
Section IV then discusses the broader implications of the 
“federalism” issue. While the theory suggests the desirability of 
taking a global approach to some antitrust matters in order to protect 
global economic well-being, there are significant obstacles to the 
creation of an effective worldwide antitrust authority. 
Section V presents our main conclusions. We argue that there are 
good economic and political reasons for limiting the role of states in 
antitrust matters that extend beyond their borders. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FEDERALISM IN  
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
A.  The Legal Process as a Political Tool 
A substantial academic literature suggests that antitrust 
policymaking and enforcement often serve narrow private agendas 
rather than broad public ends.
37
 According to this research, politicians 
are responsive to lobbyists because lobbyists represent interests that 
are more focused and better organized than consumer interests. At 
 
35. Lande observes that, while the states have agreed to a common set of rules, the 
National Association of Attorneys General Merger Guidelines, “[n]o set of guidelines with 
fifty different potential enforcers can offer anything close to predictability, however, since 
enforcers with divergent philosophies necessarily will interpret ambiguous terms 
differently in various factual contexts.” Lande, supra note 7, at 1063. 
36. See Plaintiff Litigating States’, New York (No. 98-1233) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s 
Proposal]. 
37. See generally T HE  CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE  PUBLIC-
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); George 
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); 
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 
98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of 
Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
No. 3]  Federalism in Antitrust 885 
work are relatively small coalitions of producers with a “strong 
community of interests [who] tend to have stronger political voices 
because each group member has a larger financial stake in the 
outcome. . . .”
38
 While these small coalitions stand to receive 
substantial benefits, any costs imposed on the nation as a whole are 
diffused and therefore are not as damaging to a politician as the cost 
of refusing to help the well-organized special interests.
39
 
Given these incentives, it is hardly surprising that private 
companies often move aggressively to influence antitrust cases by 
pushing for tough prosecution of a rival and arguing for restrictive 
remedies at a case’s close. For a business, the political process 
represents one more weapon in its competitive arsenal. 
Of course, strong lobbying efforts can influence any elected 
official, state or federal. In national antitrust cases, however, state 
AGs are especially vulnerable to parochial interests, particularly as 
compared to unelected federal enforcers. State officials frequently 
face well-funded, well-organized, coalitions of in-state businesses 
arguing for the prosecution of an out-of-state company—an unequal 
political contest. We can expect state officials to be more likely to 
choose in-state interests over national ones—not because they are 
corrupt, but because political incentives encourage this kind of action. 
For example, state AGs are elected officials and many aspire to higher 
office.
40
 It can be politically rewarding to bring high-profile cases 
against large corporations, especially if their headquarters are out-of-
state. Federal authorities, on the other hand, represent the nation as a 
whole. While lobbying certainly can and does occur at the federal 
level, the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are less 
vulnerable to narrow state interests. 
Private interests are expressed through the political process in a 




38. William F. Shughart II, Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, in THE CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, 
at 7, 13. See also OLSON, supra note 14. 
39. As Posner noted, due to geographic concentrations of companies within a state, the 
potential exists to exercise “a great deal of power to advance the interest of businesses 
located in [a Congressman’s] district however unimportant the interests may be from a 
national standpoint.” Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 
47, 83 (1969). 
40. For instance, Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut’s Attorney General, was recently 
accused of using his office to “make himself a national political figure.” Editorial, A 
Welcome Rebuke, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2002, at A12. 
41. For a general discussion of the relationship between lobbying and democracy, see 
JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS (1994). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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companies can do this directly or use third parties, such as industry 
trade groups sponsored by companies with similar interests.
42
 For 
example, in the technology sector a great many associations are 
headquartered in Washington, D.C. and are geared towards 
influencing Congress.
43
 Corporations may also fund legal teams and 
experts who write reports in an effort to have charges brought against 
a rival, or in an attempt to make a stronger legal case against a 
competitor.
44
 Once an antitrust case is underway, rival corporations 
and their associations often take an active role by sponsoring “friend 
of the court” briefs and comments.
45
 
Companies have come to view political pressure and litigation not 
as occasional and extreme measures, but as everyday business tools.
46
 
Private lawsuits, or even just the threat of them, can be used as 
bargaining chips in business negotiations. Recently, Be Inc. and Sun 
Microsystems each filed lawsuits against Microsoft stemming from 
allegations in United States v. Microsoft.
47
 For example, AOL sued 
for alleged damages resulting from the actions Microsoft took against 
Netscape (later acquired by American Online (AOL)) that were found 
 
42. See MANCUR  OLSON, JR., THE  ROBERT  SCHUMAN  CENTRE AT THE EUROPEAN 
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE VARIETIES OF EUROSCLEROSIS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
NATIONS  SINCE  1982 (1995), for a discussion of economic problems associated with 
entrenched interest groups. 
43. For example, the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA), the 
Project to Promote Competition and Innovation in the Digital Age (ProComp), the 
Software and Information Industry Innovation Association (SIIA), Association for 
Competitive Technology (ACT), and Americans for Technology Leadership (ATL) are 
organizations comprised of individual and company members that lobby government to 
promote their group’s interest in the technology sector. See Information about CCIA, 
available at http://www.ccianet.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2003); ProComp, a group founded 
by Netscape Communications, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and other technology 
companies,  available at http://www.procompetition.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 
2003); ACT, a pro-Microsoft group, available at http://www.actonline.org/about (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2003); ATL at http://www.techleadership.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). 
44. For instance, United Technologies Corp. and Rolls-Royce funded experts to write 
reports to convince European regulators to reject General Electric Co.’s proposed $42 
billion purchase of Honeywell Inc. Laurie P. Cohen, How United Technologies Lawyers 
Outmaneuvered GE, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2001, at B1. 
45. See, e.g., Michael Kanellos, AOL Hopes to File Brief in Microsoft Antitrust Case, 
CNET NEWS, Oct. 24, 2000, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-247541.html? 
legacy=cnet (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). See also index of comments on the United States 
v. Microsoft Settlement, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-major.htm (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2003). 
46. See David Yoffie & Sigrid Bergenstein, Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of 
the Corporate Political Entrepreneur, 28 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 124 (1985). 
47. Complaint and Jury Demand, Be Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., (N.D. Cal.) (No. 
02837MEJ),  at http://www.beincorporated.com/msft_complaint.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2003); Complaint, Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., (N.D. Cal.) (No. C02-
01150), available at http://www.sun.com/lawsuit/complaint.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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to be anticompetitive by the courts. As a Wall Street Journal article 
observed, “[t]he Netscape lawsuit is just the latest move in a bigger 
chess match between AOL and Microsoft.”
48
 AOL is the world’s 
largest Internet access provider and has an extensive proprietary 
online network that competes directly with Microsoft’s MSN Internet 
service. “AOL had been holding out the prospect of a lawsuit as a 
threat against Microsoft as the two companies negotiated last spring,” 
the Journal story noted.
49
 
The nature of political and legal pressure implies that once one 
company in a sector uses these tactics as part of a competitive 
strategy, all companies in that sector face stronger pressures to follow 
suit. It is extremely risky for a company to ignore the state capital or 
Capitol Hill when its competitors are actively wooing local and 
federal politicians. This follows directly from the arguments we make 
above: politicians respond to well-organized and vocal communities. 
B.  A Free Ride for States 
The costs associated with the rent seeking motivations of state 
participants might theoretically be a reasonable price to pay in 
exchange for the benefits that additional antitrust watchdogs bring to 
a case. But what do the states really bring to a national case? Antitrust 
experts working for the FTC and the DOJ analyze thousands of cases 
each year.
50
 In contrast, most states review only a few antitrust cases 
in a given year. For example, Pennsylvania conducts only twenty-five 
antitrust investigations per year.
51
 
This relative lack of expertise in antitrust cases at the state level 
leads to a higher probability of missteps. As Lande puts it, “A state 
assistant attorney general, who might in his or her career have 
seriously examined the competitive effects of only a handful of 
mergers, is more likely to make mistakes during his or her occasional 
forays into merger enforcement no matter how intelligent, diligent, 
 
48. Julia Angwin & Jared Sandberg, Netscape Goes One More Round, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 24, 2002, at B1. 
49. Id. See also Dan Carney & Jay Greene, The Wind Shifts for Microsoft, BUS. WK., 
Feb. 12, 2001, at 93. 
50. In 2001, the DOJ initiated 275 antitrust investigations and received notifications for 
2,376 mergers. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS: 
FY 1992 - FY 2001 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10108.htm (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2003). 
51. Most states do not report how many antitrust investigations they undertake. See 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Offices of the Budget, available at 
http://sites.state.pa.us/ PA_Exec/Budget/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2002). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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and public-spirited the effort.”
52
 
Consider this description from James Tierney, the former Attorney 
General of Maine: 
Most state attorneys general now have antitrust divisions usually 
located as part of the Consumer or Public Protection Divisions 
within their office. The number of specific lawyers assigned full 
time to antitrust is usually quite small, but when particular cases 
arise most attorneys general will assign senior civil litigators to 
assist on a particular matter.
53
 
In other words, most of the people that litigate antitrust cases on 
behalf of state attorneys general have little direct experience in 
antitrust matters. 
Combined with the lack of antitrust expertise is a lack of resources. 
No one state can match the money or manpower that federal agencies 
can bring to bear. For the small group of states that report a separate 
line item in their budgets, Table 1 shows state AG antitrust budgets, 
noting the percent of the total AG budget that antitrust outlays 
comprise.
54
 DOJ and FTC antitrust budgets are included for 
comparison. 
 
52. Lande, supra note 7, at 1064. 
53. James E. Tierney, NAAG Antitrust,  available at http://users.clinic.net/ 
jtierney/articles/art5.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2003). 
54. All states report AG budgets, but only those states included in Table 1 report 
specific budgets for antitrust enforcement. The state AG budgets vary considerably across 
states. California has the highest AG budget ($619.9 million), while New Hampshire has 
the smallest ($2.2 million). See California state budget, FY2002, available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/BUD_DOCS/Bud_link.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2002); 
New Hampshire state budget, FY2002 , available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us 
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TABLE 1. STATE AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST BUDGETS  





Antitrust Budget as a 
Percent of Total Budget 
FY2002 
Maryland 1.0  5.1% 
New Hampshire  0.1  4.5% 
Florida
* 2.5  1.8% 
New York  2.2  1.2% 
Massachusetts 0.5  1.0% 
Michigan 0.6  1.0% 
California 5.6  0.9% 
North Carolina  0.5  0.7% 
Pennsylvania 0.8  0.7% 
Ohio 0.4  0.6% 
    
U.S. FTC  73.0  46.8% 
U.S. DOJ  130.8  5.3% 
Source: State budgets, FY2002 except where noted; http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/168.cfm; 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/budgetsummary/btd/1975_2002/btd01summary.htm. * Data from FY2001. 
 
State antitrust expenditures pale in comparison to federal 
expenditures. Among those states reporting a separate line item, 
antitrust budgets are usually only one to two percent of the overall 
AG budget. Only two states, Maryland and New Hampshire, devote 
more than two percent of their AG budget to antitrust. Florida, which 
is among the most active states in terms of antitrust enforcement, has 
an annual antitrust budget of $2.5 million and a staff of twenty-
three.
55
 California, the largest state in terms of population, spent $5.6 
million. The budget for the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice, on the other hand, was $130.8 million in fiscal year 2002.
56
 
Moreover, the DOJ employs a total staff of approximately 850, 
including sixty staff economists who participate in every 
 
55. Press Release, National Ass’n of Attorneys General, Oregon Attorney General 
Hardy Myers Appoints New Chair and Vice Chair of NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task 
Force (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.naag.org/news/pr-20011129-
or_antitrust.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2003). 
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATION FIGURES FOR THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 6 
(2003),  available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10804a.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2003). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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investigation.
57
 Meanwhile, the FTC spent $73 million on antitrust 
enforcement in FY2002 and maintains a staff of approximately 500, 
including at least forty economists.
58
 Even a group of states acting in 
concert would have fewer experienced staff and face more severe 
budget restrictions than the DOJ or FTC.
59
 
Fewer experienced personnel and less funding means that states 
have little to contribute to an antitrust case the federal government has 
already chosen to pursue. As a result, state efforts in national antitrust 
enforcement at best amount to little more than free riding on federal 
actions. 
Unfortunately, state efforts in national cases do not stop with 
relatively benign free riding. By joining federal agencies in antitrust 
prosecution, each state becomes an additional party to settlement 
negotiations.
60
 Because of states’ more narrow interests, settlements 
that promote national economic welfare are not guaranteed to satisfy 
state demands. Thus, state participation reduces the probability of 
reaching a resolution, and when one is reached, increases the costs of 
achieving that resolution. Even more troublesome, settlements 
endorsed by the states are more likely to involve rent redistributions 




57. Charles A. James, Address at the Program on Antitrust Policy in the 21st Century 
16 (May 15, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/speeches/11148.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2003)) (remarking that the DOJ employs 
60 staff economists); Antitrust Fares Relatively Well in President’s FY 2003 Budget, But 
Slowing Merger Pace Can Spell A Problem, American Antitrust Institute, available at 
http://antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/168.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Antitrust 
Fares Relatively Well] (noting that the DOJ has an antitrust staff of 851). See also 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT ON 
COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S., OCT. 1, 1998 - SEPT. 30, 1999 7-8, 
available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/Annual_reports/1999-00/us.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter OECD]. 
58. Antitrust Fares Relatively Well, supra note 56 (noting that the FTC employs a staff 
of 505 and spent $ 73 million in FY 2002); OECD, supra note 56, at 8. 
59. We do not address the division of antitrust responsibilities between the DOJ and the 
FTC here. 
60. Robert Hahn, The Benefits of MS-Settlement 25 REG. 11 (2002). See also Thomas 
Leary, Address at the Sixth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum at Northwestern 
University Law School (Nov. 3, 2000) (transcript available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharma.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2002); CARL 
SHAPIRO, ANTITRUST LIMITATIONS TO PATENT SETTLEMENTS (Berkeley Center for Law 
& Tech., Working Paper No. 5-01, 2001), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
institutes/bclt/pub/wp/501.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). 
61. It is by no means obvious that federal antitrust policies developed by the Federal 
Trade Commission or the U.S. Department of Justice have had a positive effect on 
consumer welfare. For some preliminary evidence that suggests federal antitrust policies 
have not enhanced consumer welfare—at least in the context of structural remedies—see 
Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization 
Cases, 80 OR. L. REV. 109 (2001). See also Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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C.  Conflicting Competition Policies 
Another cost of state involvement in national antitrust cases is the 
potential for confusing, contradictory state-level enforcement. At the 
federal level, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act pre-merger notification rules 
provide antitrust authorities with substantial information on the 
merging companies, which tends to weed out mergers unlikely to 
cause anticompetitive harm, resulting in fewer merger cases 
scrutinized by federal authorities reaching litigation.
62
 In contrast, 
when states file merger challenges, Hart-Scott-Rodino does not apply 
and less information is available for review by state enforcers.
63
 
Moreover, with access to less information, state trial courts are more 
likely to grant preliminary injunctions—with each state court 
potentially applying different standards.
64
 
When states file antitrust cases under state statutes rather than 
under the Clayton or Sherman Acts, the likelihood of inconsistent and 
conflicting antitrust precedent is even higher. As a result, state action 
affects not only current cases, but can also affect future firm behavior. 
With mergers, the possibility of a challenge from any of the fifty 
states, each with its own standard of evaluation, could prevent 
companies from even attempting a beneficial transaction.
65
 As Lande 
points out, “it is confounding enough for antitrust counselors to have 
to contend with two potential federal enforcement agencies.”
66
 
Even if state laws were identical, the interpretation and application 
of those laws would differ “since enforcers with divergent 
philosophies necessarily will interpret ambiguous terms differently in 
various factual contexts.”
67
 Philosophical differences in approaches to 
antitrust enforcement are likely to stem from many sources, such as 
                                                                                                                              
Antitrust Policy and Consumer Welfare: Assembling the Empirical Evidence (Mar. 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Even if it were true that antitrust 
enforcement at the federal level does not enhance consumer welfare, our analysis suggests 
that limiting state involvement in national cases would still be an improvement over the 
current situation in which states effectively lobby for their narrowly defined interests in the 
antitrust political arena. 
62. See Bell, supra note 11, at 39. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires that parties to 
certain mergers or acquisitions (determined by the value of the transaction or the size of 
the parties) notify the FTC before consummating the proposed acquisition. The parties 
submit company and transaction information to the FTC as part of the notification process. 
They must then wait a specified period of time (usually thirty days) while the FTC reviews 
the proposed transaction. 16 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803. 
63. Bell, supra note 11, at 39. 
64. Id. 
65. Lande, supra note 7, at 1047; Bell, supra note 11, at 39. 
66. Lande, supra note 7, at 1062. 
67. Id. at 1063. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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political affiliation, educational training, and personal experience. The 
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) Merger 
Guidelines for the states explicitly allow for this, noting that the 
general policy can be supplemented or varied in light of differing 
precedents, and “in the exercise of [the AGs’] individual prosecutorial 
discretion.”
68
 While differing views can be helpful in some areas of 
law, such as when different states provide a testing ground for new 
regulations appropriate for federal adoption,
69
 this kind of 
experimentation is likely to be wasteful in the antitrust arena. 
III. A  CASE STUDY OF FEDERALISM IN ANTITRUST  
ENFORCEMENT: UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT 
While the entire four-year United States v. Microsoft trial record 
offers numerous examples of rent seeking and delays or 
complications due to state involvement, we focus here on a small, but 
important, part of the case. Section A centers on the rent seeking 
aspects of the case, specifically the lobbying efforts made by 
Microsoft and its rivals in attempting to influence the settlement 
process and the remedy proposed by the litigating states as a 
substitute for the settlement reached between Microsoft and the DOJ. 
Section B summarizes state participation in the trial, examining the 
problem of states free riding on federal efforts. Section C reviews the 
legal arguments made by Microsoft, the DOJ, and a coalition of states 
regarding the litigating states’ standing to press for a remedy different 
from the one defined by the settlement. 
A. Rent  Seeking 
1.  Lobbying—Politics as Usual 
The Microsoft case illustrates the many avenues that rent seeking 
can take in national antitrust enforcement. Through the course of the 
lawsuit, rivals lobbied state attorneys general, federal antitrust 
authorities, and even the courts. 
As noted earlier, states are especially vulnerable to special interest 
pressures. California in particular—which is home to Silicon 
 
68. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General, 52 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at S-3 (Mar. 12, 1987). 
69. See Martti Vihanto, Competition Between Local Governments as a Discovery 
Procedure, 148 J. INSTITUTIONAL THEORETICAL ECON. 411 (1992); Ronald J. Daniels, 
Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 
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Valley—has seen especially aggressive lobbying in the Microsoft 
case. Indeed, the idea that it is the state government’s job to serve its 
corporate constituents is so ingrained that elected officials do not try 
to conceal their complicity. Shortly after California and several other 
states decided to reject the settlement, a local newspaper reported that 
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer said “his resolve was 
hardened after listening over the weekend to advice from technical 
experts and officials from Microsoft’s competitors, such as IBM, 
AOL Time Warner Inc., Sun Microsystems Inc. and Novell Inc.”
70
 
California subsequently took the lead in the continuing litigation—in 
particular, by providing funding. As one press account confirmed, 
“Microsoft’s competitors lobbied California lawmakers and Governor 
Gray Davis to approve the extra $3.7 million for antitrust enforcement 
. . . .”
71
 
In fact, companies in the technology sector have been wielding the 
antitrust weapon for many years.
72
 At least as far back as 1993, 
Novell, a major producer of computer networking software, urged the 
FTC to pursue an antitrust case against Microsoft.
73
 When the FTC 
decided to suspend its investigation, Novell, Lotus, and WordPerfect 
lobbied the Department of Justice to pick up where the FTC left off.
74
 
More recently, Microsoft’s rivals have increased their visibility in 
Washington and dramatically increased their lobbying expenditures.
75
 
For example, in 1998, Sun underwrote the $3 million cost of a team 
of legal and economic experts given the task of persuading the 
 
70. Ted Bridis, Many of 18 States Prepare to Reject Settlement with Microsoft, 
Ardmoreite Business, available at http://www.ardmoreite.com/stories/110601/mon_ 
microsoft.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). See also Mary Ann Ostrom, Lockyer in 
Limedlight of Marathon Case, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 7, 2001, at C1. 
71. States Say They Have Funds to Press Microsoft Case, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 8, 2001, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001/11/08/microsoft-states.htm (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2003). In all likelihood, California expects to be reimbursed for that 
expenditure. In January 2002, Microsoft agreed to pay approximately $10 million to the 
nine settling states to reimburse them for legal fees incurred during the litigation. 
Associated Press, Microsoft to Pay Legal Bills of States That Settled Suit, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/01/31/microsoft-settlement.htm (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2003). 
72. For example, IBM’s competitors “egged on the antitrust suit that the Department of 
Justice filed against IBM in 1969.” DAVID M. HART, NEW ECONOMY, OLD POLITICS: THE 
EVOLVING  ROLE OF THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY  INDUSTRY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 9 
(Working Paper, Jan. 15, 2001) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy),  available at http://ksghome2.harvard.edu/~.Dhart.CSIA.Ksg/papers/new 
_economy_old_politics.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). 
73. See Julie Pitta, Microsoft’s Dark Shadow, FORBES, Mar. 1, 1993, at 107. 
74. RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, TRUST ON TRIAL 197-98 (2000). 
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Department of Justice to bring an antitrust case against Microsoft.
76
 
 Microsoft is no more immune to the inducements of the current 
system than its rivals are. In its early years, Microsoft paid little or no 
attention to politics.
77
 But, after years of antitrust accusations, the 
company has learned to play the game as well. In fact, Microsoft has 
been accused of trying to delay the case
78




At the court level, the Tunney Act proceedings—in which the 
district court judge was required to weigh the merits of antitrust 
settlements in terms of the broader public interest—was yet another 
venue for special interest pleading.
80
 Ironically, one of the 
motivations for enacting the Tunney Act was to shield antitrust 
decisions from politics.
81
 Competitors and pro-defendant groups alike 
can and do file comments, though. AOL, Novell, Palm, 
RealNetworks, SBC, and Sun Microsystems all filed Tunney Act 
comments against the settlement.
82
 Trade groups supported by many 
of Microsoft’s biggest rivals also opposed the settlement and filed 
 
76.I d . at 88-94. 
77. Microsoft did not establish a Washington D.C. policy office until 1995. The office 
began with only two professional staffers. Until 1998, when the group expanded and 
moved, the policy group’s office was located within the Microsoft federal sales group’s 
office. HART,  supra note 71, at 14. Evidently, Microsoft began its policy group 
reluctantly: “I’m sorry we have to have a Washington [D.C.] presence,” Bill Gates told 
The Washington Post in 1995. Mind Behind the Microsoft Miracle, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 
1995, at H1. 
78. Press Release, Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n, CCIA Condemns 
Microsoft’s Attempts to Delay Case (Aug. 14, 2001), available at http://www.ccianet.org/ 
press/01/0814.php3 (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). 
79. Comments of Computer & Communications Industry Association on the Revised 
Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (C.A.D.C. 2001) 
(No. 98-1232 (CKK)), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-
00030610b.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Comments of CCIA]. The 
government responded to public comments alleging that the judgment “resulted from 
improper influence exerted by Microsoft” by stating that the allegations “lack any factual 
support,” and that they are solely based on “the fact and size of Microsoft’s political 
contributions.” Response of the United States to Public Comments on the Revised 
Proposed Final Judgment at 7-8, Microsoft (No. 98-1232 (CKK)), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f10100/10145.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). 
80. The Tunney Act requires a federal court to certify that consent judgments proposed 
by the United States are in the public interest. The Tunney Act proceeding provides an 
opportunity for any interested party to submit comments on the proposed decree. 15 
U.S.C. § 16 (2003). 
81. See Bell, supra note 11, at 39. 
82. The U.S. Department of Justice has posted “major” comments on the proposed 
settlement; links for these are provided at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-major.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2003). Direct competitors submitting “major” comments include: AOL 
Time Warner, Red Hat, RealNetworks, SBC, Novell, Palm, and Sun Microsystems. Id. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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motions asking for permission to participate in the hearings.
83
 On the 
other side, several associations aligned with Microsoft responded in 
kind by arguing for the settlement.
84
 
As these examples highlight, lobbying is ubiquitous within the state 
and federal executive branch and in the judicial branch. We would 
argue, however, that among these three groups, the states are the most 
likely to succumb to lobbying. The narrower interests of the particular 
industries and consumer groups within its own borders are more 
likely to guide a state than executive agencies or the federal judiciary. 
Pressure from in-state companies is more likely to lead to actions that 
do not comport with national consumer interests. On the other hand, 
as comments made by officials at the Justice Department illustrate, 
federal authorities appear to be a much tougher sell for lobbyists than 
state AGs. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Charles James 
emphasized his concern over special interests: “Indeed, the number of 
requests for meetings with me immediately after my nomination but 
before my confirmation became so daunting that I adopted the posture 
of refusing to meet personally with any third parties in the Microsoft 
case. . . .”
85
 That is, while lobbying certainly occurs at the federal 
level, the sheer magnitude of issues and points of view on all sides of 
 
83. In particular, the CCIA and ProComp each submitted comments. Press Release, 
Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n, CCIA Seeks to Intervene in Microsoft 
Settlement Hearing (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ccianet.org/press/ 
02/0208.php3 (last visited Apr. 7, 2003); Press Release, The Project to Promote 
Competition & Innovation in the Digital Age, ProComp Files Motion Asking to Participate 
in Tunney Act Proceedings (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.procompetition.org/ 
headlines/020802.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). CCIA, another lobbying association that 
receives major funding from Microsoft’s competitors, including Sun and Oracle, also filed 
a comment. Comments of CCIA, supra note 78. The Progress & Freedom Foundation, a 
think-tank that receives funding from (among others) Sun, Novell, Oracle, IBM, and SBC 
filed a comment as well. Comments of The Progress & Freedom Foundation on the 
Revised Proposed Final Judgment and the Competitive Impact Statement, Microsoft (No. 
98-1232 (CCK)), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-
00030606.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2003). 
84. For example, ACT and ATL filed comments. Comments of the Association for 
Competitive Technology, Microsoft (No. 98-1232 (CCK)), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00027806.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2003); Email from Jim Prendergast, Executive Director, Americans for Technology 
Leadership, to the Department of Justice (Jan. 28, 2002, 11:40:00), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/public/34/mtc-00033587.htm (last visited Apr. 
8, 2003). 
85. Charles A. James, The Real Microsoft Case and Settlement, 16 ANTITRUST No. 1, at 
66 n.16. Deborah Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, also “decried 
what she called the ‘strategic use’ of antitrust lawsuits by companies to hurt competitors.” 
She remarked that one lobbyist for a Microsoft competitor “threatened that if I did not do 
as his client wished, I could count on the fact that I would never again get any more help 
in Silicon Valley in any investigation in the future.” Mark Wigfield, DOJ Atty Decries 
Companies’ Politicization of Antitrust, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 2, 2002. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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an issue make reaching a federal authority a more costly proposition 
for lobbyists. More importantly, federal authorities have a broader 
base of interests—protecting national welfare as opposed to 
protecting a handful of important employers within one state. In some 
cases, however, the payoffs for lobbying federal authorities can be 
higher as well. It remains an empirical matter as to whether federal 




2.  The Litigating States’ Proposed Remedy—A  
Voice For Competitors 
In many of the Tunney Act filings, Microsoft’s critics derided the 
settlement put forth by the Department of Justice, nine of the original 
plaintiff states, and Microsoft as being too weak.
87
 These critics said 
the remedy proposed by the remaining nine litigating states and the 
District of Columbia would do a better job of restoring competition.
88
 
But a close look at the states’ proposal leads to very different 
conclusions. The Department of Justice along with nine states chose 
to settle the case.
89
 One state, South Carolina, withdrew its complaint 
in December 1998 when Internet access leader AOL announced it 
would purchase Netscape; another state reached an independent 
settlement with Microsoft.
90
 Another thirty states never participated in 
the litigation at all. Meanwhile, the nine remaining states along with 
 
86. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
87. See, e.g., Comment of Robert E. Litan, Roger D. Noll, and William D. Nordhaus on 
the Revised Proposed Final Judgment, Microsoft (No. 98-1233 (CKK)), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00013366.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2003). The authors argue in favor of either a structural separation or the litigating states’ 
remedy. For a critique of a structural remedy, see Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory 
Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2000). For an 
analysis of the litigating states’ proposed settlement see Hahn, supra note 60. See also 
George Priest, Editorial, Microsoft Wins . . . Sort Of, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2001, at A14. 
88. See, e.g., Press Release, The Project to Promote Competition & Innovation in the 
Digital Age, ProComp Calls on Court to Uphold Antitrust Law in Microsoft Case (June 6, 
2002),  available at http://www.procompetition.org/headlines/061902.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2003); Press Release, Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n, States AG’s 
Remedial Proposal: a “Solid, Thoughtful Effort” (Dec. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.ccianet.org/press/01/1207.php3 (last visited Apr. 8, 2003); Press Release, 
American Antitrust Institute, American Antitrust Institute Applauds New States’ Microsoft 
Proposal (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/159.cfm (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2003). 
89. These states, listed earlier, presumably had their own parochial reasons for settling. 
See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a list of the settling states. 
90. Both South Carolina and New Mexico were party to the original lawsuit. New 
Mexico reached an independent settlement with Microsoft in July 2001. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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the District of Columbia have decided to pursue litigation.
91
 
While the litigating states account for only a small portion of the 
U.S. population and economy, they do represent some of Microsoft’s 
most vocal rivals.
92
 California is home to Apple, Palm, Oracle, Sun 
Microsystems, and Netscape (although Netscape is now part of AOL 
Time Warner, based in New York). Massachusetts is home to the 
Lotus division of IBM as well as major operations of Sun and Oracle. 
Utah is home to Novell. Accordingly, the attorneys general for these 
states resisted settlement attempts and instead pushed both the Justice 
Department and the courts for stronger action against Microsoft.
93
 By 
no coincidence, the states’ remedy proposal neatly dovetails with the 
interests of Microsoft’s competitors. To illustrate the danger of state 
involvement in federal antitrust proceedings, we focus on the main 
provisions in the litigating states’ proposed remedy. 
a.  Raising a Rival’s Costs 
One of the most stringent provisions in the litigating states’ 
proposed remedy is the prohibition on the “binding” of “middleware” 
code to Microsoft’s operating system software.
94
 In short, the 
litigating states would require Microsoft to allow licensees (mostly 
PC manufacturers) to remove the software code for any middleware 
they could conceivably single out, while still requiring Microsoft to 
maintain the performance of the operating system. This provision is 
far more restrictive than including “Add/Remove” buttons that delete 
access to, but do not remove the code for, the limited middleware at 
issue during the trial.
95
 To comply, Microsoft argued it would have to 
 
91. As noted above, the nine litigating states are California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Utah, and West Virginia. 
92. The nine states plus the District of Columbia represent only 26 percent of the U.S. 
population. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (122nd ed. 2002). 
93. See Michael F. Brockmeyer, Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 215 (1989). Robert Bell expands on this point: “State attorneys general 
are elected officials, and parochial political concerns may well influence their decisions to 
challenge mergers. Suits may be filed to generate favorable publicity, to prevent plants or 
offices from being transferred to another state, or merely to thwart unpopular acquirors 
[sic], such as foreign companies.” Bell, supra note 11, at 39. 
94. Plaintiff’s Proposal, supra note 35, at 2. Because the definition of the terms 
“middleware” and “browser” were hotly debated during the remedies phase of the trial, for 
clarity we rely on the litigating states’ definitions. 
95. In response to the DOJ settlement, Microsoft updated its most recent operating 
system, Windows XP, to allow the removal of access to the five types of middleware 
analyzed during the trial: Internet Explorer (a Web browser), Outlook Express (an email 
program), Windows Media Player, Windows Messenger (for instant messaging), and 
Microsoft’s version of the Java Virtual Machine. Joe Wilcox, Antitrust Case Spurs XP 
Makeover, ZD Net, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-922147.html (last visited HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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rewrite the Windows operating system from scratch as a combination 
of thousands of separable, modular components.
96
 Computer makers 
could then offer PCs with various versions of “Windows” installed 




Consider the implications. Under the litigating states’ definition of 
middleware, many different kinds of software features would have to 
be remade in a way that made them removable from Windows. But 
software developers rely on interfaces
98
 in many of Microsoft’s 
middleware programs for their own programs to run. For example, 
SnapStream’s Personal Video Station, a digital video recorder, relies 
on Windows Media Player for playing back recorded programs.
99
 
Software developers like SnapStream would no longer be able to 
count on the presence of key segments of software code in Windows. 
Instead, to ensure that their software worked properly, developers 
would have to provide the software code themselves or obtain and 
distribute it separately for consumers to install as needed. The 
immediate result would be to raise software developers’ costs, but the 
provision would also raise Microsoft’s costs to the extent that 
consumers blamed Windows for any difficulties with applications.
100
 
End-users may or may not want versions of Windows with certain 
middleware code removed. Microsoft, in anticipation of the consent 
decree, has already put several of its middleware products in the 
                                                                                                                              
Apr. 8, 2003). 
96. See Joe Wilcox, Gates Says States’ Remedy “Impossible”, CNET.COM, available at 
http://news.com.com/2102-1001-888101.html (April 22, 2002). Designing any modern 
operating system with millions of lines of code, especially a new modular operating 
system, is generally accepted to be an extremely difficult and costly task. For instance, it 
took about three years for Linus Torvalds and the open source programmers contributing 
to Linux to develop version 1.0 of the Linux Kernel. What is Linux, LINUX ONLINE, 
available at http://www.linux.org/info/index.html (last visited March 22, 2002). 
97. In addition to OEMs (original equipment manufacturers), all licensing, contract and 
negotiation rules would apply to “third-party licensees” offering to purchase and 
redistribute at least 10,000 licenses for a product or combination of products. This would 
include individuals, independent software vendors (ISVs), systems integrators, and value-
added resellers. Therefore, any licensee ordering the minimum 10,000 copies would be 
able to dictate what middleware had to be removed from Windows. See  Plaintiffs’ 
proposal, supra note 36, at 26. 
98. An important example is the application programming interfaces, or APIs. 
99. See David Coursey, Coming Soon: Windows Your Way, ZDNET NEWS, (May 24, 
2002), available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-922183.html. 
100. For a discussion of the strategy of raising rivals costs, see generally Steven. C. 
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); 
Steven. C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 19 
(1987); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L. J. 209 (1986). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 10/30/2003 9:13 PM 
No. 3]  Federalism in Antitrust 899 
Add/Remove utility program.
101
 It is unclear whether PC 
manufacturers will take advantage of this option
102
—multiple 
versions of “Windows,” each with different middleware products 
removed, could cause confusion among consumers. If so, support 
costs for Microsoft, other software developers, and computer 
manufacturers would increase due to necessary questions determining 
which version of Windows was installed on the computer. Thus, the 
litigating states’ provision would allow rivals to impose high costs on 
Microsoft with no apparent benefit to end consumers.
103
 
The litigating states’ remedy would also micromanage Microsoft’s 
pricing decisions in an unconventional way. The proposal would 
require that each less-than-complete version of Windows be licensed 
at a reduced price, with the discount proportional to the relative 
“development costs” of the omitted Microsoft middleware.
104
 
If a Microsoft programmer had a flash of inspiration and created 
valuable new middleware for Windows in just a few days, 
Microsoft’s discount for omitting that middleware would be 
negligible. If another feature, less valuable to consumers but still 
deemed worthy of investment, took months to develop, the discount 
associated with omitting the feature would be much higher. The 
remedy would thus require that discounts be based on the cost of 
inputs alone rather than being influenced by market demand—which 
 
101. See Wilcox, supra note 96. 
102. PC manufacturers have responded positively to the option. “Several PC makers 
have already indicated that they would consider swapping out Microsoft middleware, such 
as Windows Media Player or Windows Messenger, for competing software. But many are 
still evaluating their options.” Data on which manufacturers have actually removed 
Microsoft middleware from their PCs was unavailable when this article was written. See 
Wilcox, supra note 96. 
103. In another example of raising Microsoft’s costs, the litigating states’ remedy 
would require Microsoft to distribute, free of charge, a version of the “Java runtime 
environment” that is “compliant with the latest Sun Microsystems Technologies 
Compatibility Kit” with each copy of Windows and IE. Plaintiffs’ proposal, supra note 36, 
at 10. Note that, as part of the settlement for an earlier suit brought by Sun, Microsoft had 
already agreed to cease developing its own version of Java and eventually to stop 
distributing its version altogether. See Settlement Agreement and Mutual Limited Release, 
Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 97-20884 (D.N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 1997) 
available at www.microsoft.com/presspass/java/01-23settlement.asp. Requiring a 
company to distribute a competitor’s product could set a dangerous precedent: where 
should this type of bundling end? See the discussion in David Morgenstern, Sun vs. MS: 
Whose Side Are You On? ZDNET  NEWS (Mar. 14, 2002), available at 
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-859758.html. 
104. The maximum total discount would be 25 percent, unless Microsoft offered the 
middleware for sale separately, such as for use by customers who obtain a version of 
Windows that omitted it. In that case, the discount would be determined by the separate 
distribution “price” and would not be limited to 25 percent. See Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra 
note 19, at 3. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 10/30/2003 9:13 PM 
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ordinarily leads market prices to reflect value to consumers. 
To understand the implications of this kind of pricing rule, consider 
two possible consequences. The version of Windows containing 
Windows Messenger instant messaging software would be priced 
higher than the “base” version. But AOL could still give away its 
competing Instant Messenger. Similarly, Microsoft would have to 
charge extra if Media Player were included with Windows, but 
RealNetworks could continue to give away versions of its RealPlayer. 
The pricing rule could result in higher prices for consumers: those 
wanting Microsoft’s versions of middleware would have to pay for 
them according to the proposal’s formula. Moreover, rival 
middleware producers would face less price competition. 
b.  Intellectual Property Giveaways 
In another attempt to aid Microsoft’s rivals, the litigating states 
would require Microsoft to license large amounts of valuable 
intellectual property (IP) for little or no compensation.
105
 Competitors 
would get Microsoft’s software code for free, but consumers could 
suffer in the long term from decreased innovation since the disclosure 
requirements would leave Microsoft with little incentive to improve 
Windows or many of the company’s applications programs. 
Under the litigating states’ proposed remedy, Microsoft would have 
to sell through auction the right to adapt its Office business 
applications suite to non-Windows operating systems.
106
 The auction 
would recognize three winners, all of whom could decide to adapt 
Office to the same operating system.
107
 Microsoft would receive only 
 
105. This paper covers just a few examples of the IP giveaway requirements in the 
litigating states’ remedy. Another provision calls for Microsoft to license “all intellectual 
property rights . . . that are required to exercise any of the options or alternatives provided 
or available to them under this Final Judgment.” Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra note 36, at 11. 
Microsoft would have to disclose “all APIs, Technical Information and Communications 
Interfaces” needed to permit rival middleware to achieve “interoperability” with Microsoft 
software. Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra note 36, at 6. Microsoft would also have to allow 
“qualified representatives of OEMs [original equipment manufacturers, or PC makers], 
ISVs [independent software vendors], IHVs [independent hardware vendors], IAPs 
[Internet access providers], ICPs [Internet content providers], and Third-Party Licensees” 
to “study, interrogate and interact with the source code and any related documentation and 
testing suites of Microsoft Platform Software.” Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra note 36, at 7. 
The litigating states define Microsoft Platform Software as operating systems and 
middleware, so it would seem to encompass all of Microsoft’s major products. 
106. Auction winners would not be allowed to adapt Office to the Macintosh platform 
either (note that Microsoft already maintains a version of Office for the Macintosh). 
Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra note 19, at 11. 
107. One plausible scenario is that more than one of the three auction bidders would 
want to adapt Office to the open source operating system Linux. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 10/30/2003 9:13 PM 
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the one-time auction bids and would be prevented from charging any 
royalty payments. If multiple auction winners chose to adapt Office to 
the same platform, stiff competition at auction would likely result in 
modest auction payments to Microsoft. Thus, in addition to losing a 
stream of royalty payments, Microsoft could receive little in auction 
payments. 
Equally important, the company would lose a distinguishing 
application for the Windows platform and would be required to 
disclose portions of the intellectual property encompassed in 
Windows. As part of the mandated auction, Microsoft would have to 
provide all relevant source code for both the Macintosh and Windows 
versions of Office
108
 as well as “all parts of the source code of the 
Windows Operating System Product necessary for the porting.”
109
 
New versions of Office, plus all new “necessary” Windows source 
code, would also have to be passed on to the auction winners at no 
additional charge. All told, it is unlikely that Microsoft would receive 
full compensation for the intellectual property embedded in Office 
and Windows. 
Yet another provision of the litigating states’ proposal would 
require Microsoft to release its browsers (Internet Explorer and MSN 
Explorer) under “open source” licenses.
110
 That is, Microsoft would 
have to release source code (the “blue prints”) for the browsers to the 
general public—not just to three auction winners as with Office—for 
use, modification and redistribution. And it would have to do so for 
free. 
Thus, under the litigating states’ remedy, technology companies 
stand to gain a great deal of Microsoft’s intellectual property at little 
to no cost. Any rival wishing to clone Windows or to improve another 
operating system could access the technology included in Internet 
Explorer (IE), MSN Explorer, and Office. Sun Microsystems, for 
example, could use the disclosure provisions to gain access to 
information needed to copy key Windows features in its server 
operating system, Solaris. Oracle, IBM and Novell, all of which 
compete with Microsoft in email software, would be in a similar 
 
108. These are different products based on unrelated source code. 
109. Porting is the technical term for adapting software to different platforms. 
Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra note 19, at 11. 
110. Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra note 19, at 9. Along with the requirement to give away 
source code, Microsoft would also have to expend resources to assist competitors in 
understanding the source code with the goal of modifying it. For additional information on 
open source licensing, see The Open Source Initiative, The Approved Licenses, available 
at http://www.opensource.org/licenses/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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position. They could learn how Microsoft’s email software, the MS 
Exchange Server, communicates, significantly lowering the costs of 
cloning Exchange. The result would be a large-scale expropriation of 
Microsoft’s intellectual property. 
The intellectual property giveaway would be even more helpful to 
competitors because it would be offered in combination with the 
binding and pricing provisions discussed above. Consider that under 
the provisions Microsoft would have to provide its browsers as open 
source software. At the same time, Microsoft would have to charge a 
higher price for any version of Windows containing the IE browser, 
as compared to the versions without it. Since it could not guarantee 
the presence of the browser software code, Microsoft could not tout 
IE as a feature that enhanced Windows. On the other hand, AOL 
would remain free to pay computer makers not to install any 
Microsoft browser software (IE or MSN Explorer) and to feature the 
AOL browser (currently a customized version of IE).
111
 Under these 
circumstances, few computer makers would distribute Internet 
Explorer and none would ever pay for it. Thus, under the litigating 
states’ remedy, AOL could more easily maintain its dominance in 
Internet access and instant messaging. 
In fact, virtually all of the IP disclosure rules proposed by the 
litigating states are designed in a way that guarantees Microsoft could 
not recoup the value of R&D investments through licensing. A few 
examples: IE and MSN Explorer would be provided free of charge; 
the Office auction would allow for a one-time payment only with no 
ongoing royalties; all new Office enhancements would be given to the 
auction winners for free; and large amounts of Windows source code 
would be shown to competitors for free. 
 
111. An analyst at Giga Information Group noted that cutting all ties with Microsoft is 
“one of [AOL’s] goals in life.” Julia Angwin & Rebecca Buckman, America Online Tests 
Netscape Browser, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2002, at B4. As part of that process, AOL 
recently completed testing a version of Netscape’s browser as a possible replacement for 
the customized version of IE it currently provides its subscribers. AOL is expected to 
switch browsers for all 34 million AOL users from IE to Netscape. See Kim Stuart, AOL 
Releases Netscape Update, Aims to Win Back Web Surfers, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Aug. 29, 
2002,  available  at  http://www.wsj.com. Estimates of Netscape’s share of users differ 
dramatically depending on the estimation method. The Jim Hu article reports the Netscape 
current share at around 3.4 percent. See Jim Hu, AOL Launches New Netscape Browser, 
ZDNET  NEWS (Aug. 29, 2002), available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-
955850.html. “According to comScore, 14 million home Internet users, or 12.3% of home 
users, actively used Netscape in June 2002, compared with 76.6 million, or 67.1%, for 
Internet Explorer.” See  Riva Richmond, New Netscape Browser to Heat Up AOL-
Microsoft Rivalry,  DOW  JONES  BUSINESS  NEWS, available at http://biz.yahoo.com/ 
djus/020830/1424000477_2.html (Aug. 30, 2002). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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The initial effect of providing broad access to intellectual property 
after it has been developed is necessarily positive for consumers, who 
need not compensate the innovator to get the benefit. But the long-
term effects are decidedly negative: a firm will have little incentive to 
invest in development if it cannot prevent others from using its 




B. Free  Riding 
The preceding analysis suggests that the litigating states expended 
a good deal of effort in crafting a proposed remedy that would benefit 
in-state technology companies. But how much energy did the states 
expend during the trial in supporting the allegations that were raised? 
As we show below, not nearly as much as they did later to facilitate 
rent seeking. The states did not add to the allegations raised by the 
DOJ, which were already extensive; nor did they contribute 
meaningfully to the support of those allegations during the trial. 
Given the above discussion regarding the lack of state antitrust 
experience and resources, this is neither surprising nor necessarily 
bad. The problem lies in the fact that the states main contribution to 
the trial was to reject the settlement and to propose an alternative 
remedy that would largely benefit competitors rather than 
competition. 
As noted earlier, the states have few resources to contribute to the 
prosecution of national antitrust cases. The antitrust budget for 
California, one of the lead states in the Microsoft  trial, was $7.5 
million in FY2001 and $5.6 million in FY2002. Of the 2002 amount, 
$3.7 million was targeted specifically for antitrust enforcement in the 
“high-technology industry.”
113
 While California’s budget reflects its 
leading role in the Microsoft remedies trial, and is unusually high for 




112. As Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole observe, “the regulated firm may refrain 
from investing in the fear that once the investment is in place, the regulator would pay 
only for variable cost and would not allow the firm to recoup its sunk cost.” JEAN-
JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND 
REGULATION 54 (1993). 
113. Taxpayer Group Blasts Lockyer’s Request for More Money to Regulate High-Tech 
Industry: Budget Request Proves That the Case Against Microsoft Was Just the Beginning, 
National Taxpayers Union & NTU Foundation Press Release, available at 
http://www.ntu.org/news_room/press_releases/pr_052301a.php3 (May 23, 2001). 
114. See State of California, Department of Finance, 2002-2003 Governor’s Budget, 
LJE 57, Line 22, available at http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget03/ 
pdf/lje.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2002). HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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For the Microsoft case alone, the Department of Justice spent $7 
million through 1999.
115
 By the beginning of 2001, this amount went 
up to nearly $50 million.
116
 The total amount spent through 2002 is 
certain to be higher still. 
The states’ substantive legal contribution is more important than 
their level of spending. Here too, however, the record indicates that 
the litigating states were free riding on the DOJ’s efforts. Indeed, 
since the beginning of the case, the states have not added substantially 
to the charges levied against Microsoft. The states’ original complaint 
included only two claims not already made by the United States 
government.
117
 The states later dropped one of these claims; the other 
was dismissed as a matter of law.
118
 
After the dismissal, the allegations made by the states were 
essentially identical to those made by the DOJ. In fact, the two cases 
differed only marginally in other aspects as well: certain states sought 
penalties and counsel fees under their respective state statutes.
119
 
Aside from these differences, however, the states’ case was identical 
to the case brought by the United States. As a result, the Court 
consolidated the two cases.
120
 
The states contributed little during the trial as well. The individual 
states’ claims were not specifically addressed by the Court and the 
states assured the Court that all relevant state statutes were 
coterminous with the Sherman Act. No discovery was targeted at any 
state law as distinct from the Sherman Act.
121
 The Court directed that 
 
115. James V. Grimaldi, Microsoft Probe Has Cost Federal Government $13.3 Million, 
SEATTLETIMES.COM  (Oct. 6, 1999), available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
news/technology/html98/micr_19991006.html. 
116. Declan McCullagh, DOJ Pushes Case Against MS, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2001), 
available at http://www.wired.com/news/antitrust/0,1551,41163,00.html. 
117. First, the states claimed that Microsoft had unlawfully monopolized the market for 
“office productivity suite” software applications. Second, they claimed that Microsoft had 
unlawfully “leveraged” a monopoly in PC operating systems to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage in other products. See Plaintiff States’ Complaint, New York, et al. v. Microsoft 
Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233, 109-19 (D.D.C. May 18, 1998). 
118. The office suite claim was dropped. See Plaintiff States’ First Amended 
Complaint, State of New York, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 
(D.D.C. Jul. 17, 1998). The monopoly leverage charge was dismissed as a mater of law. 
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998 WL 614485, 27 (D.D.C. 1998). 
119. Plaintiff States’ First Amended Complaint, at 35 e and f. 
120. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5212 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2001). 
121. See Memorandum of Defendant Microsoft Corporation in Support of Its Motion 
for Dismissal of the Non-Settling States’ Demand for Equitable Relief, State of New York, 
et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/feb02/02-26ndismissal.asp. In its response to 
Microsoft’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Dismissal, the DOJ stated that “the 
non-settling States are advancing claims under federal law.” See Memorandum Amicus HAHN GALLEY.DOC 10/30/2003 9:13 PM 
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witnesses would be questioned by only one lawyer for each side—that 
is, one lawyer for the defendant and one lawyer representing all of the 
plaintiffs, federal and state governments combined.
122
 While the states 
could have requested separate examination of any witness, they never 
sought any additional questioning. 
None of the District Court rulings distinguished charges made by 
the plaintiff states. The Findings of Fact
123
 make reference only to the 
consolidated actions while the Conclusions of Law mentions the 
plaintiff states only briefly, noting, “[t]he facts proving that Microsoft 
unlawfully maintained its monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act are sufficient to meet analogous elements of causes of 
action arising under the laws of each plaintiff state.”
124
 In short, the 
states’ and the United States’ cases were tried as a single case. 
Likewise, the Appeals Court ruling treats the states’ case as subsumed 
by United States’ case.
125
 
It was not until the remedies phase, after all the arguments had 
been made and all of the evidence presented, that the federal and state 
cases were split.
126
 The states did not add to the determination of 
charges. They did not add to the evaluation of evidence. But they did 
want to add to the penalties imposed at trial’s end. While free-riding 
on the DOJ’s allegations and arguments is harmless (limited state 
participation is, after all, what we are advocating), joining in a suit for 
the sole purpose of altering remedies to benefit in-state constituencies 
is not. The piling-on in the remedies phase illustrates the danger of 
state involvement in national or global antitrust enforcement. 
C.  The Arguments For and Against State Involvement 
In an attempt to defuse the “cluster bomb”
127
 created by the states, 
                                                                                                                              
Curiae of the United States Regarding Microsoft Corporation’s Motion for Dismissal of 
the Non-Settling States’ Demand for Equitable Relief at 17, State of New York et al. v. 
Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj/atr/cases/f10900/10980.pdf. 
122. See Memorandum of Defendant Microsoft Corporation in Support of Its Motion 
for Dismissal of the Non-Settling States’ Demand for Equitable Relief, State of New York 
et al. v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2002), 
available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/feb02/02-26ndismissal.asp. 
123. Findings of Fact at 2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232, 
and New York et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1999), 
available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/c-fof/fof.asp. 
124. Conclusions of Law at 43 United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-
1232, and New York et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 
2000), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/col/col.asp. 
125. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
126. Plaintiffs’ Proposal, supra note 19. 
127. Posner uses this phrase to describe “the tendency of antitrust litigation to create HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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Microsoft submitted a legal brief calling for a dismissal of the 
demand for equitable relief by litigating states.
128
 In the brief, 
Microsoft argued that the states did not have standing to seek a 
remedy separate from the federal government on issues that were not 
state-specific. In particular, Microsoft argued that the litigating states 
fell short on four points of law: 
1. The litigating states lacked parens patriae standing to seek 
relief under federal law. 
2. State law does not offer the relief sought. 
3. Granting the litigating states the right to seek the relief sought 
raises serious constitutional issues. 
4. The relief sought is contrary to the conditions and principles of 
equity expressed in the Clayton Act. 
In response to Microsoft’s brief, the plaintiff states as well as 24 
states not involved in the remedies proceedings (including many of 
the states that accepted the DOJ-Microsoft settlement) filed a brief 
with the court opposing Microsoft’s motion.
129
 The states denied that 
they were obliged to demonstrate any state-specific injury. Moreover, 
they asserted that they had in fact demonstrated their standing as it is 
defined in existing case law. 
The U.S. Department of Justice also weighed in on the debate, 
submitting an amicus curiae brief at the request of the judge 
overseeing the trial.
130
 While the DOJ brief agreed in principle with 
Microsoft’s argument, it rejected Microsoft’s interpretation of current 
law. In short, “the United States [found] no definitive case law that 
would require granting the relief Microsoft [sought] as a matter of 
law.”
131
 However, it did concede that “[t]he movement of some States 
into the field of antitrust enforcement with respect to national or 
international markets, and their demands for relief that will affect 
competition and consumers outside of their borders, raise issues that 
                                                                                                                              
multiple lawsuits out of a single dispute.” Posner, supra note 11, at 3. 
128. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Microsoft’s Motion for Dismissal, 
supra note 121. 
129. Memorandum of 24 States as Amici Curiae in Support of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, The District of Columbia, and the States of California, Connecticut, Iowa, 
Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Utah, and West Virginia, State of New York, et al. v. 
Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2002). 
130. Memorandum Amicus Curiae of the United States Regarding Microsoft 
Corporation’s  Motion for Dismissal of the Non-Settling States’ Demand for Equitable 
Relief, New York et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f10900/10980.pdf. 
131. Id. at 1. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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have not been fully developed in the jurisprudence.”
132
 And it 
concluded, “[t]he important considerations of antitrust policy and 
federal-state relations set forth in the Motion should be given 




Judge Kollar-Kotelly ruled for the litigating states, denying 
Microsoft’s motion. Nonetheless, she acknowledged the importance 
of the issues raised by Microsoft, noting that “the legal issues 
addressed herein may prove appropriate for consideration in a 
subsequent case where they are not hobbled at the outset by the 
existing law of the case.”
134
 
While the Microsoft case has left the question of state involvement 
in national antitrust cases for future law, the economic evidence is 




IV. THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERALISM IN ANTITRUST: IS 
THE WORLD READY FOR A GLOBAL ANTITRUST AUTHORITY? 
The preceding analysis illustrated how a state brings very little to 
the table in prosecuting alleged antitrust violations beyond its borders. 
States typically do not have the resources and expertise to protect the 
interests of consumers nationwide.
136
 More importantly, they do not 
face appropriate incentives because they represent a fraction of 
consumers, a subset of industries, and a small portion of competitors 
within an industry. 
This raises a natural question: should the U.S. government or other 
national and supranational governments (such as the European 
Commission) have the primary responsibility for administering 
antitrust policy in markets that are multinational in scope? Or should 
that responsibility be placed in a separate institution, such as a global 
antitrust authority? 
Many of the issues behind these questions are analogous to the 
 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 27. 
134. New York v. Microsoft, 209 F. Supp.2d 132, 155 (D.D.C. 2002). 
135. We discuss just what those limitations might comprise in the conclusions to the 
paper. 
136. Moreover, as Lande notes, “Principles of federalism suggest that states were not 
meant to have so much ability to influence national affairs. States entered the union 
knowing they would occasionally have to sacrifice their own economic interests for the 
greater good of the nation.” Lande, supra note 7, at 1062. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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state-federal government debate. For instance, rent seeking based on 
national politics and conflicting approaches to competition policy 
across jurisdictions are problems at the supranational level, not just 
the state level. Other issues, such as coordinating an enforcement 
body that sovereign nations would agree to, are unique to 
transnational institutions. We explore these issues in the following 
sections and then turn to potential solutions. The theoretical case for a 
global antitrust authority with enforcement powers flows logically 
from the discussion of the problems with dual state and federal 
enforcement presented earlier. If a benevolent authority could be 
designed, it would be possible in principle for this authority to 
increase economic welfare.
137
 That is, a global authority could, in 
theory, be free from parochial national concerns and would be less 
susceptible to lobbying by national interests. There are, however, 
serious practical problems in designing such an authority. 
A.  National Antitrust Resources 
It is instructive to begin by examining current national and 
supranational resources devoted to antitrust. Table 2 lists annual 
outlays of several countries along with the European Commission 
(EC).
138
 While none of the jurisdictions spends as much as the U.S., 
several jurisdictions do have substantial budgets, such as the EC, 
Korea, and Japan. Many jurisdictions employ significant numbers of 




Of course, high dollar budgets and large staffs do not necessarily 
translate into “good” antitrust policy. It is not always clear whether 
specific jurisdictions have the expertise to address antitrust issues that 
 
137. An alternative that might be more attractive to economists would be to focus on 
economic efficiency, or the sum of changes in consumer and producer surplus. On 
economic efficiency, see generally MICHAEL  L. KATZ  &  HARVEY  S. ROSEN, 
MICROECONOMICS (1998); and JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 
(1997). 
138. The table does not include private sector expenditures, which are likely to be 
substantial. Also note that staff numbers reported earlier for DOJ and FTC are for different 
years, and therefore, differ from the total US staff number reported in the table. 
139. Russia had a population of 145 million people in 2000. Russian Population in 
Steep Decline,  BBC NEWS, (Oct. 24, 2000) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/europe/988723.stm. The U.S. had a population of 281 million in 2000. See U.S. 
Population: The Basics, available at http://www.ameristat.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ 
Ameristat/Topics1/Estimates__Projections/U_S_Population_The_Basics.htm (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2002). Therefore, the U.S. has around four antitrust enforcers per million people 
while Russia has just over twelve enforcers per million. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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cross national boundaries.
140
 The United States is a recognized leader 
in this area, with substantial economic and legal expertise residing 
within the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission.
141
 In contrast, both the European Commission and 
Japan’s Fair Trade Commission, for instance, have not developed 




TABLE 2. NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL  
ANTITRUST RESOURCES 
Country 
Annual Budget (US$ 
Million) Total  Staff 
United States  140.1  1157 
Korea 77.3  431 
European Commission 59.9  537 
Japan 53.6  558 
Turkey 49.0  297 
United Kingdom  46.6  153 
Australia 32.9  401 
Canada 25.8  382 
Germany 18.0  262 
Netherlands 10.1  124 
Mexico 9.7  201 
Denmark 8.7  187 
Norway 7.7  145 
Sweden 7.3  116 
 
140. Global Competition Review conducts a survey that rates competition bureaus 
across the world. The GCR conducted interviews with thousands of competition 
“specialists,” such as lawyers, in-house corporate counsel, economists and others over a 
four-month period in twenty-five countries. The respondents rated antitrust agencies in 
several different performance areas, including (to name just a few) economic expertise, 
performance in merger and cartel cases, and independence from political influence. In 
addition to grading the agency, respondents also commented on performance particulars. 
In the most recent GCR analysis, the U.S. DOJ scored a perfect mark (5 of 5 stars). 
Germany’s competition bureau (Bundeskartellamt) scored four and a half stars and the 
European Commission scored four stars. The Mexican and Argentinean authorities, 
however, scored only two stars and Brazil scored only one. See Rating the Enforcers 2002, 
GLOBAL-COMPETITION.COM (2002), available at http://www.globalcompetition 
review.com. 
141. Id. at 48. 
142. Id. at 22, 33, respectively. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 10/30/2003 9:13 PM 
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New Zealand  7.1  71 
Russia 4.7  1834 
Finland 3.4  54 
Switzerland 2.9  57 
Hungary 2.1  103 
Argentina 1.4  23 
Czech Republic  1.0  106 
Slovak Republic  0.7  71 
Belgium 0.2  51 
Note: The European Commission budget is reported for FY2001. All other data are reported for 1999-2000. 
Source: OECD website at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/Annual_reports/1999-00.htm; European Commission 
website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/abb/abb_2002/comp_en.htm#top. 
B.  National Rent Seeking 
Just as with individual states in the U.S., the problem of national 
incentives transcends that of resources and expertise. Do federal 
antitrust authorities have adequate incentives to improve economic 
welfare beyond a country’s borders? 
Certainly, a case can be made that within the U.S. the federal 
antitrust authorities have an incentive to protect the interest of 
consumers nationwide—at least to a greater extent than the state 
AGs.
143
 But in a world in which business is increasingly conducted 
globally, the implications of national antitrust enforcement often 
extend beyond the borders of individual countries. We therefore 
return to the same problem discussed before, just on a grander scale: 
each country’s government—by design—cares more for its own 
citizens than it does for the citizens of other nations. 
A case affecting consumers in different nations or regions in 
different ways would most likely bring partisan national interests to 




143. Limiting antitrust enforcement to federal agencies most likely would not eliminate 
lobbying. Corporations on both sides of an antitrust case would still have strong incentives 
to lobby the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission directly. And surely 
the parties would still pressure their Congressional representatives to promote their 
preferred policy positions. Nonetheless, as Posner notes: “The federal government, having 
a larger and more diverse constituency, is, as James Madison recognized in arguing for the 
benefits of a large republic, less subject to takeover by a faction.” POSNER, supra note 1, at 
281. 
144. Thomas L. Boeder & Gary J. Dorman, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger: 
The Economics, Antitrust Law and Politics of the Aerospace Industry, 45 ANTITRUST HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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Both companies were based in the United States and had no 
productive assets in Europe. However, they did business on a global 
scale.
145
 The FTC reviewed the merger and concluded that McDonnell 
Douglas no longer constituted a meaningful competitor in the market 
for commercial aircraft and proceeded to approve the merger.
146
 The 
EU, however, argued that the merger was anticompetitive because it 
would create a dominant player that would harm competition in 
Europe.
147
 U.S. authorities then accused Europe of protecting 
European-based (and subsidized) Airbus rather than consumers. 
Regardless of the motivations for Europe’s opposition to the 
merger and despite the similarity of the rules governing antitrust in 
the U.S. and the EU, crucial differences remain. Some Americans 
claim that the EU antitrust review process is too open to influence.
148
 
In any region, regardless of the institutions in place, “The pressures to 
turn an issue of antitrust into an issue of national might are great 
when the matter is ‘too important’ and especially when nationalistic 
instincts are provoked.”
149
 The current Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust, Charles James, cautions that the most serious problem 
posed by multi-jurisdictional merger enforcement “is the significant 
risk that economic nationalism will prevail in antitrust merger 




Multiple jurisdictions taking part in global antitrust enforcement 
also leads to the by now familiar problem of multiple vetoes. A 
handful of states were able to derail early settlement talks in United 
States v. Microsoft; a handful of countries can do the same at a 
worldwide level. As David Evans observes, “According to the U.S. 
Council for International Business, a typical multinational corporation 
needs to file in 20 to 30 jurisdictions to propose a merger. An 
objection by any country in which either firm does significant 
                                                                                                                              
119 (Spring 2000). 
145. At the time of the merger, Boeing accounted for over sixty percent of world sales 
of commercial jets; Airbus, a European consortium that has received subsidies from three 
European governments, accounted for around thirty percent; McDonnell Douglas 
accounted for around five percent. Fox, supra note 26, at 19-24. 
146. Boeder & Dorman, supra note 144, at 135. 
147.  The Commission Clears the Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas 
Under Condition and Obligations, The European Commission Press Release IP/97/729, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc= IP97 
/729|0|AGED&lg=EN&display= (last visited Aug. 29, 2002). 
148. For example, Evans discusses lobbying efforts made by chief competitors during 
the GE and Honeywell merger review. See Evans, supra note 27, at 18. 
149. Fox, supra note 26, at 23. 
150. James, supra note 57, at 3. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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business can kill a deal.”
151
 The EU recently did just that: after the 
U.S. DOJ approved the merger of General Electric and Honeywell, 
the European Commission moved to block the deal. As of this 
writing, the case was on appeal.
152
 
As a theoretical matter, it is unclear whether national authorities are 
more or less vulnerable to rent seeking efforts in the global arena as 
compared to state AGs in the national arena. On the one hand, it is 
generally more costly to lobby national enforcers. As noted above, 
Charles James received so many requests for meetings during the 
Microsoft case that he refused to meet with anyone except the parties 
directly involved. Breaking through the clutter of multiple lobbyists 
would necessarily be difficult and costly for would-be rent-seekers. 
On the other hand, the potential payoff to lobbying is higher. The 
actions that national authorities take can generate significantly greater 
rents than the actions available to state AGs. For example, the 
benefits of trade quotas or government-sanctioned national cartels 
could make the extra effort in lobbying worthwhile.
153
 
C.  Conflicting Jurisdictional Approaches 
As discussed earlier, state involvement in national antitrust 
enforcement can lead to a jumble of laws for businesses to navigate. 
With multinational corporations obliged to notify twenty or thirty 
jurisdictions of merger plans, the jumble of laws can be equally 
troublesome at the global level as well.
154
 This increases uncertainty 
and costs for businesses and may prevent them from engaging in 
 
151. Evans,  supra  note 27, at 15. See also International Competition Advisory 
Committee Hearing, Washington, D.C., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
icpac/2601.htm (Apr. 22, 1999). 
152. GE and Honeywell Contest EU Veto, BBC NEWS,  available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1541569.stm (Sept. 13, 2001). 
153. For example, on two separate occasions U.S. producers of citric acid tried to use 
anti-dumping duties to shelter the domestic market from Chinese imports. Both petitions 
failed, however. See Simon J. Evenett et al., International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons 
from the 1990’s, 24(9) WORLD ECON. 1221, 1227 (Sept. 2001). 
154. Multiple suits are also an issue in antitrust cases. This issue was one of the 
motivations for the creation of the European Commission: “Another reason for legislating 
at the Community level has been the need to create and maintain equal conditions for 
economic operators. Competition could be distorted if undertakings in one part of the 
Community had to bear much heavier costs than in another . . .” See Case 92/79, Comm’n 
v. Italian Republic, 1980 E.C.R. 1115, 1122 P 2.13. Antitrust cases can span continents as 
well. In addition to the DOJ case, the European Commission also alleged that Microsoft 
engaged in anticompetitive behavior. Commission Initiates Additional Proceedings against 
Microsoft, the European Commission Press Release IP/01/1232, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc= 
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potentially welfare-enhancing activities such as mergers.
155
 
The solution to this problem would be a uniform set of regulations, 
but defining global antitrust guidelines that countries could agree 
upon is a very difficult task.
156
 Different countries have different 
antitrust regulations. Even the United States and Europe, which have 
cooperated for years on competition policy, have major differences in 
their theoretical approaches to enforcement.
157
 Add in Australia, 
Canada, Japan, and other countries—ninety or so currently have some 
form of competition laws—and one observes almost as many methods 
of addressing competition regulation as there are countries.
158
 
Ideology, historical accident, and country size are just a few of the 
factors that have led to variations in antitrust enforcement. Capitalist 
and non-capitalist countries will clearly view “monopoly power” and 
“anticompetitive” behavior through different lenses.
159
 In Japan, 
social norms led to strong cross-company (both vertical and 
horizontal) organizations (“keiretsu”) that are well ingrained; until 
recently the government has had little political will to control these 
cartels.
160
 Country size can matter too: “The fear of scale economy 
losses” can deter smaller nations from opposing in-country 
mergers.
161
 Frederick Jenny argues that just such a concern led to 
France’s weak and selective enforcement of its merger control policy. 
He concludes that a “lingering feeling” among public officials that 
larger companies are better able to withstand international 
competition encouraged France to view national monopolies 
 
155. James,  supra note 57; Timothy J. Muris, Merger Enforcement in a World of 
Multiple Arbiters, Remarks Presented at the Brookings Institution Roundtable on Trade 
and Investment Policy, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/brookings.pdf 
(Dec. 21, 2001). 
156. Even within the United States, the individual states had difficulty in agreeing on 
the NAAG Merger Guidelines. See New Mexico Attorney General Stratton Repudiates 
NAAG’s Horizontal Guidelines, 52 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1314, 
May 7, 1987, at 869. 
157. See generally James, supra note 57; William J. Kolasky, North Atlantic 
Competition Policy: Converging Toward What?, Address Before the BIICL Second 
Annual International and Comparative Law Conference, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11153.pdf (May 17, 2002); Evans, supra note 
27, at 14. 
158. 1 WORLD TRADE ORG. ANN. REP., Special Topic: Trade and Competition Policy 
(1997), at 31, 45. 
159. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 36. 
160.I d . at 73-76. For a discussion of improvements, see Rating the Enforcers 2002, 
supra note 140, at 33 (“Cartel enforcement is a strength—especially bid-rigging cases. The 
JFTC has taken aim at the construction section, electronic appliances, petroleum products, 
civil engineering works and medical care.”) 
161. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 61. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 10/30/2003 9:13 PM 




Given the obstacles to reaching an agreement on rules, the current 
trend in international antitrust is towards multilateral working groups 
hosted by formal and informal international institutions. Several of 
these groups are focused on defining a uniform set of antitrust 
guidelines. The newest and perhaps most important initiative is the 
International Competition Network (ICN), which was founded in 
October 2001 by antitrust officials from fourteen jurisdictions. Its 
members now include sixty countries representing seventy-five 
percent of world GDP.
163
 The ICN has formed working groups to 
address a variety of issues in international antitrust enforcement. The 
group’s long-term goal is to develop one set of guiding principles to 
which members will adhere voluntarily.
164
 
Several other international organizations, including the OECD, 
WTO, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), have established working groups and programs to 
examine issues in international antitrust. Nearly all of these 
organizations serve as debating forums and are essentially designed to 
promote the convergence of antitrust regulations across nations. None 
are intended to become international antitrust authorities with their 
own enforcement powers. 
On a smaller scale, several countries have signed bilateral 
agreements of cooperation between antitrust authorities.
165
 One key 
agreement is between the United States and the European Union.
166
 
This accord lays out the terms of cooperation between the United 
States and the European Union. One of its primary purposes is to 
address problems of multi-jurisdictional enforcement. The agreement 
defines the objective as follows: 
 
162. Frederick Jenny, French Competition Policy in Perspective,  in  COMPETITION 
POLICY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS 185 
(W.S. Comanor et al. eds., 1990). 
163. James, supra note 57. 
164. Both James and Kolasky note that they do not expect to “achieve convergence on 
all merger issues in the first year, or even the second or third.” James, supra note 57, at 28. 
See also William J. Kolasky, International Convergence Efforts: A U.S. Perspective, 
Address Before the International Dimensions of Competitive Law Conference, at 5, at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10885.pdf (Mar. 22, 2002). 
165. See, e.g., Antitrust Cooperation Agreements, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/public/international/int_arrangements.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2002). 
166. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the 
Enforcement of their Competition Laws,  available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
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Establish cooperative procedures to achieve the most effective and 
efficient enforcement of competition law, whereby the competition 
authorities of each Party will normally avoid allocating 
enforcement resources to dealing with anticompetitive activities 
that occur principally in and are directed principally towards the 
other Party’s territory, where the competition authorities of the 
other Party are able and prepared to examine and take effective 
sanctions under their law to deal with those activities.
167
 
In theory, the agreement attempts to allocate enforcement resources 
in order to avoid overlap. In practice, this is not always how it is 
done, especially in high-profile cases with important competitive 
implications in both the United States and the European Union.
168
 
D.  Toward A Global Antitrust Authority 
  As the myriad of bilateral agreements and international group 
efforts attest to, achieving a single set of rules to govern worldwide 
competition regulations is a daunting task. But even if it were 
possible, enforcement of the regulations would surely differ 
dramatically across countries. As Simon Evenett et al. observe, 
“Different national competition authorities applying identical 
principles in identical cases are likely to reach different conclusions 
or specify different remedies.”
169
 Changing staff in government 
administrations or in national courts could easily alter interpretations 
of the rules.
170
 Even with well-trained personnel, many aspects of 
antitrust enforcement are more art than science. For example, tough 
issues like defining the relevant market are difficult for one country, 
let alone multiple countries attempting to act together. 
Very difficult distributional issues are likely to arise if a principle 
of worldwide consumer welfare were adopted in various countries 
and regions. Assume, for the sake of argument, that all participating 
nations agree that welfare should be the overriding goal of every 
antitrust enforcement action.
171
 It is not hard to imagine a situation in 
 
167. Id. 
168. The merger of GE and Honeywell, which the U.S. DOJ approved but the European 
Commission blocked, provides a recent example of conflict arising from enforcement on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
169. Simon J. Evenett et al., Antitrust Policy in an Evolving Global Marketplace, in 
ANTITRUST  GOES  GLOBAL: WHAT  FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC  COOPERATION? 16 
(Simon J. Evenett et al., eds., 2000). See also Evans, supra note 27, at 14. Note that this 
problem is analogous to the situation with the states and their differing interpretation of the 
NAAG Merger Guidelines, as discussed above. 
170. Evenett et al. (2000), supra note 169, at 22. 
171. But see Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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which global welfare was enhanced by a particular merger, but 
consumers in some countries were made worse off by the 
consolidation.
172
 That is, the benefits accruing to some nations far 
outweighed the harm to a handful of others, so that overall welfare 
increased.
173
 It is difficult to imagine a nation willingly placing global 
welfare above national interests, however. The former U.S. FTC 
Chairman Robert Pitofsky has in fact said the FTC would be skeptical 
of such an approach: “Balancing anti-competitive effects in a 
domestic market against efficiencies in a foreign market is unusually 
difficult. . . . [I]t is an unattractive prospect to “tax” United States 
consumers (as a result of the domestic anticompetitive effect) in order 
to confer benefits on U.S. exporters and non-U.S. consumers.”
174
 
A recurring issue in multinational cartel enforcement illustrates 
another problem: information sharing.
175
 Even when nations agree 
that cartels should be prosecuted,
176
 getting genuine cross-border 
cooperation is difficult. Evenett, Levenstein, and Suslow discuss 
several examples of countries harmed by the activities of export 
cartels based in other nations, but “the lack of cooperation from home 




Agreeing on common rules, an important and difficult first step, is 
not enough. As the above examples highlight, agreeing on 
information sharing guidelines, enforcement mechanisms, and 
accountability rules would also be required if international 
competition law coordination is to develop further. 
To solve the above problems of uneven expertise, misaligned 
                                                                                                                              
and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000). 
172. For a discussion of this scenario in terms of the U.S. and the EU, see Evenett et al. 
(2000), supra note 169, at 22. See also the discussion in the 1 WORLD TRADE ORG. ANN. 
REP., supra note 158, at 30. 
173. Of course, this kind of trade-off can occur within a nation too. In the U.S., federal 
antitrust enforcers are not supposed to sacrifice welfare in one or more states for overall 
national benefit. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). 
174. Robert Pitofsky, The Effect of Global Trade on United States Competition Law 
and Enforcement Policies, given at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/fobebf1.htm (Oct. 15, 1999). 
175. Because different countries are likely to have varying standards of confidentiality, 
the lack of information sharing in cartel enforcement might well be justified in some cases. 
176. Because many of its trading partners did not (and many still do not) prohibit 
cartels, the U.S. passed the Webb-Pomerene Act in 1918. The Act exempts American 
export cartels from some of the legal restrictions against cartels. See Webb-Pomerene Act 
of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1994). The Export Companies Trading Act of 1982 provides 
additional exemptions to registered U.S. export cartels. See Export Trading Company Act 
(the ETC Act) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233. See also the discussion in 
Evenett et al. (2001), supra note 169, at 1230. 
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incentives, conflicting regulations, and varying degrees of 
enforcement in the global arena, one might consider a rule analogous 
to barring the U.S. states from joining national antitrust proceedings: 
barring national governments from joining multinational antitrust 
proceedings. Of course, this raises the issue of devising a mechanism 
to replace national competition authorities in multiple country 




A system that acknowledges the primacy of consumer welfare 
worldwide is the natural extension of a national antitrust authority 
aimed at promoting domestic welfare. More and more products, 
particularly high technology products like computer software, are 
made and sold with little regard for national borders.
179
 While a global 
antitrust authority would solve many of the problems of balkanized 
national antitrust policies, it would have its own set of problems—
some unique and some similar to those discussed earlier in relation to 
the U.S. states’ participation in federal antitrust enforcement. 
First, a global competition authority would require nations to give 
up considerable sovereignty in the area of antitrust—something that 
politicians have been reluctant to do.
180
 Second, it would also require 
 
178. For a proposal along these lines, see SCHERER, supra note 33, at 92-96. For a more 
recent treatment, see Fox, supra  note  171. Diane Wood presents both practical and 
theoretical arguments against a global competition authority. See  Diane P. Wood, 
International Law and Federalism: What is The Reach of Regulation? 23 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 97 (Fall 1999). In other contexts, international agreements and organizations 
have evolved to deal with issues that transcend national borders, but none of these 
institutions provide a blueprint for creating a global antitrust authority with enforcement 
powers. For example, the Bretton Woods agreement established a post-war international 
economic system [The Bretton Woods agreement established the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, and International Trade Organization with the purpose of eliminating 
the causes of war. For a further discussion of Bretton Woods, see THE BRETTON WOODS-
GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS (Orin Kirshner ed., 
1996).], the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (known more commonly as GATT) 
and its successor, the World Trade Organization, arose to deal with international trade 
issues. See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE (2002). The Kyoto 
protocol, another multinational agreement, is meant to address problems with global 
climate change. See generally Scott Barrett, Towards a Better Climate Treaty, POLICY 
MATTERS 01, 29 (Nov. 2001), available at http://aei.brookings.org/policy/ 
page.php?id=21; DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE 
STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING (2001). In some cases, such as many of the 
environmental treaties, international agreements place restrictions on the behavior of 
nations, but individual nations are responsible for enforcing the treaty requirements within 
their own borders—including disciplining private firms. Such agreements do not typically 
create international institutions with authority to discipline private firms. 
179. Evenett, Lehmann, and Steil document a wave of cross-border mergers of 
“unprecedented scale.” See Evenett et al. (2000), supra note 169, at 3. 
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agreement on the goal of such an authority, which as discussed above, 
would be a non-trivial task. Third, a global antitrust authority would 
need to define a mechanism for getting individual nations to comply 
with an agreement—that is, it would need an enforcement mechanism 
to ensure nations cooperated and supplied necessary information. 
Finally, a global antitrust enforcer would require funding.
181
 
Despite the formidable obstacles, some movement toward the 
globalization of competition policy seems inevitable.
182
 But designing 
and implementing a sensible worldwide approach that would 
maximize economic efficiency and consumer welfare to antitrust is 
daunting. Current international agreements, such as the WTO, do not 
offer a viable model since they concern interactions between nations. 
They are not designed to regulate the behavior of private firms and 
they do not have enforcement powers in the same sense that national 
competition authorities do. 
The closest analogy to an international antitrust enforcement 
regime is regulation through the European Commission. The EEC 
Treaty established the competition rules for the European Economic 
Community (then consisting of six member states) in 1958, and the 
Commission was given responsibility for enforcing them in 1962.
183
 
The European Union currently consists of fifteen member nations. 
Many member nations have their own antitrust authorities,
184
 but the 
Commission is primarily responsible for enforcing competition law at 
the European level.
185
 While the European model may have some 
appeal, it developed as a result of specific historical and political 
circumstances in Europe that do not exist at the global level. As a 




                                                                                                                              
of the United States and federal preemption of state law is not unheard of within the U.S. 
181. It is unclear whether the resources allotted to a global antitrust authority would 
match those of any well-funded individual entity, such as the United States or European 
Union. That depends on the commitment of the supporting countries, which will be 
affected to a large extent by domestic politics. 
182. Witness the bilateral agreements and international working groups discussed in 
Section IV.C. above. 
183. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE  (7th 
ed. 2000). 
184. For example, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom all maintain their own competition agencies. See Rating the 
Enforcers 2002, supra note 140. 
185. National competition authorities deal with some matters that do not involve cross-
border issues. 
186. As Wood observes, “. . . there is a common assumption among many that the need 
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We should continue to proceed along a path in reforming 
competition policy that recognizes the need for acknowledging 
economic welfare considerations outside national or regional borders, 
but we should proceed with great caution. The progress towards 
convergence in antitrust policies is likely to be incremental and slow 
in coming. In the short term, it probably makes most sense for 
selected antitrust authorities, such as the United States and the 





Antitrust policy is likely to play an important role in shaping the 
world economy. The policies adopted by various levels of 
government could have far-reaching implications for the development 
of industries ranging from software to diamonds. 
This paper has examined the appropriate role for different levels of 
government in antitrust enforcement. Specifically, we highlighted the 
issue of federalism in antitrust within the U.S., focusing on the role of 
states and the federal government in developing policy. Several 
scholars have suggested that states should play a very limited role in 
antitrust enforcement, especially in matters that are national or global 
in scope. 
The analysis presented here supports the argument that the states’ 
role should be limited. Studying the behavior of the states and 
individual companies in the high-profile United States v. Microsoft 
case illustrates why the legal scholars proposing limits on state 
authority are right. The question is, limited in what ways? We feel 
that the evidence supports at least one kind of limitation: states should 
be preempted from all antitrust suits the federal government 
addresses—including cases that the DOJ or FTC investigates and 
decides to dismiss. Federal authorities are more experienced in 
antitrust enforcement, have greater resources, and are more likely to 
consider national welfare than are the individual states. Because of 
these factors, federal agencies are more likely to reach an efficient 
                                                                                                                              
is an issue that reasonable people can debate, they should do so without any illusions that 
anything like the European system would enforce such rules. We must ask whether it is 
possible to separate the structural aspects of European competition law from its content.” 
Wood, supra note 178, at 102. 
187. “The [bilateral] agreements would need no oversight or supervision by WTO 
bureaucracy. They would have the advantage of allowing countries to choose their dancing 
partners with care while avoiding both extravagant promises of cooperation and gold seals 
of approval for competition law regimes that are incompatible with their own.” Id. at 110. HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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outcome, especially in cases that are national in scope. 
Defining the appropriate state role when federal agencies have not 
acted is a more difficult matter. Our preference, especially in light of 
the lessons learned in the Microsoft trial, is that the states should not 
be involved in antitrust at the national level. A review of the states’ 
role in the case highlighted numerous examples in which Microsoft’s 
competitors, not competition itself, would have benefited from the 
plaintiffs’ proposed remedies. In addition to giving away large 
amounts of Microsoft’s intellectual property for little or no 
compensation and increasing Microsoft’s costs of doing business, 
some of the litigating states’ provisions would have rendered ongoing 
development of Windows unprofitable. Rather than restoring 
competition, the litigating states’ proposal amounts to a classic 
exercise in rent seeking. 
While there are many senses in which the Microsoft  case is 
unusual, the role of rent seeking is not one of them. Based on the 
current system of incentives, state involvement in national antitrust 
enforcement is likely to have similar rent seeking outcomes when 
corporate rivals are based in different states. States, considering the 
interests of their local and most vocal constituents, will put parochial 
concerns over national welfare. Moreover, states have little to offer 
the antitrust enforcement process in terms of expertise that is likely to 
lead to efficient outcomes. 
Despite the obvious problems with the states’ involvement in the 
Microsoft case, however, barring states entirely from national antitrust 
cases may be excessive. The federal government is far from perfect. 
Enforcement activities ebb and flow with changes in our economic 
understanding of antitrust and national politics. States may have valid 
reasons for pursuing national cases when they deem that federal 
agencies are asleep at the wheel. 
Pressure from the states could thus provide a useful check on 
federal antitrust enforcers. States could act as watch dogs while 
federal preemption (including after-the-fact preemption) would 
reduce the risks of parochial interests undermining national 
settlements and would eliminate the problems with multiple follow-on 
suits. 
Similar issues arise regarding national interests in antitrust matters 
that have a global or trans-national reach. Individual governments are 
clearly more concerned with their own consumers and producers than 
with consumers and producers in other countries. Thus, one would 
expect to see individual nations engaged in rent seeking policies that HAHN GALLEY.DOC 9/18/2003 8:51 AM 
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benefit domestic companies at the expense of foreign competitors.
188
 
One would also expect to see national polices aimed at helping 
consumers within a country, even if those policies hurt consumers 
elsewhere. 
A logical antidote to such national rent seeking is the establishment 
of some kind of global antitrust authority aimed at promoting welfare 
worldwide. Though a global antitrust authority could, in principle, be 
designed to improve global economic welfare, practical and political 
obstacles appear to rule out this option in the foreseeable future. 
However, granting the U.S. Government the authority to preempt 
state action in antitrust prosecution would be practical. Ironically, the 
European Union, whose antitrust agency is relatively new compared 
to the United States, has already adopted an analogous rule. While 
individual nations oversee antitrust enforcement within their own 
borders, the European Commission is primarily responsible for 
competition policy in cases with a cross-border aspect where 
company revenues exceed a specified amount.
189
 At the same time, 
national competition authorities can still take action where the 
Commission does not. The U.S. would do well to follow the EU lead 
by limiting state authority when a state’s action conflicts with federal 
decisions. 
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